Resolute: an assurance case language for architecture models
A. Gacek, J. Backes, D. Cofer, K. Slind, M. Whalen
HILT 2014
Arguments about the safety, security, and correctness of a complex
system are often made in the form of an assurance case. An assurance
case is a structured argument, often represented with a graphical
interface, that presents and supports claims about a system's
behavior. The argument may combine different kinds of evidence to
justify its top level claim. While assurance cases deliver some level
of guarantee of a system's correctness, they lack the rigor that
proofs from formal methods typically provide. Furthermore, changes in
the structure of a model during development may result in
inconsistencies between a design and its assurance case. Our solution
is a framework for automatically generating assurance cases based on
1) a system model specified in an architectural design language, 2) a
set of logical rules expressed in a domain specific language that we
have developed, and 3) the results of other formal analyses that have
been run on the model. We argue that the rigor of these automatically
generated assurance cases exceeds those of traditional assurance case
arguments because of their more formal logical foundation and direct
connection to the architectural model.